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Emotions seem to be epistemically assessable: fear of an onrushing truck is epistemically justified, 
mutatis mutandis, whereas fear of a peanut rolling on the floor is not. But there is a difficulty in 
understanding why emotions are epistemically assessable. It is clear why beliefs, for instance, are 
epistemically assessable: epistemic assessability is, arguably, assessability with respect to likely 
truth, and belief is by its nature concerned with truth; truth is, we might say, belief’s “formal 
object.” Emotions, however, have formal objects different from truth: the formal object of fear is 
danger, the formal object of indignation is injustice, the formal object of grief is loss, and so on. 
After considering how a number of different accounts of emotion might account for the epistemic 
assessability of emotion, we develop a novel account of the domain of the epistemically assessable, 
according to which any mental state which is constitutively evidence-responsive is epistemically 
assessable, regardless of whether its formal object is truth.  
 
1. The Epistemic Assessability of Emotions 
Suppose you sit in a dark bunker during an enemy air raid and suddenly wonder whether outside the 
bunker the sun is shining and the birds are singing. Suppose further that you then decide to believe 
that this is so. (Assume for the sake of argument that this is something you can do). This belief may 
be practically justified insofar as it could keep you from falling into despair. Still, if there is no 
evidence that the sun is in fact shining and birds are in fact singing, your belief is not epistemically 
justified. For there is no information at your disposal to suggest the likely truth of the proposition 
‘The sun is shining and the birds are singing.’ 
 Belief is thus epistemically assessable: it makes sense to ask, of any particular belief, 
whether it is epistemically justified or not. What does it take in general for a mental state to be 
epistemically assessable? Our vignette suggests the relevance of evidence possession and likely 
truth, but even without a general account of epistemic assessability, however, we can appreciate that 
some mental states are paradigmatically epistemically assessable while others are paradigmatically 
non-assessable. Belief is a paradigm of epistemic assessability: it is never a category mistake to say 
that some belief is epistemically justified or unjustified. Traditionally, perceptual experiences have 
been taken to be epistemically non-assessable, though the view has become more contentious of late 
(Siegel 2017). Still, bodily sensations certainly offer a paradigm of epistemic non-assessability. If 
you feel nauseous, or ticklish, it is hard to see in what sense your nausea/tickle experience could be 
epistemically justified or unjustified.  
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 Emotions seem in this respect more like beliefs than like nausea: they can be legitimately 
assessed epistemically. In short: 
Epistemic Assessability: Emotions are epistemically assessable.  
We formulate Epistemic Assessability as a generic rather than as a quantified proposition: it is not 
essential to our purposes here to assert the universally quantified proposition that all emotions are 
epistemically assessable, though we do not wish to make a simple existential claim that might be 
supported by a handful of atypical cases. What Epistemic Assessability asserts is that in many 
perfectly normal, in no way atypical cases, emotions are epistemically assessable.  
We will offer a more complete defense of Epistemic Assessability in section V. For now, we 
just want to note that Epistemic Assessability seems to be presupposed by our social practices 
surrounding emotion.  
 First of all, we clearly have a social practice of rationally criticizing one another’s emotional 
states (Salmela 2006), and the rationality at issue is often epistemic. People often accuse one 
another of having irrational emotions, such as anger at a small child for accidentally spilling a glass 
of milk or disgust toward people of a particular race. In some cases, the sort of irrationality at issue 
may be practical, but in others it is surely epistemic. Compare “her jealously is so irrational: in the 
end, it will only tear her and her partner apart” and “his jealousy is so irrational: all his partner did 
was smile at the waiter.” The first critique is practical, but the second is epistemic. Clearly, we take 
emotions, at least sometimes, to be subject to norms of epistemic rationality.  
 Conversely, we also have a practice of offering (epistemic) reasons for our own emotions, 
and we tend to withdraw our accusations of irrationality if someone gives us sufficiently good 
reasons. Suppose Alice, Bob, and Cat are talking about baseball. Cat says, “Did you hear that the 
Red Sox won the game yesterday?” Bob responds, “I know, I’m so happy!” Alice says “Why are 
you happy about that? You don’t even like baseball.” Alice is challenging Bob’s emotional 
response. She does not think that it makes sense for him to be happy that some particular team won 
a game given that he does not care about baseball. But suppose Bob replies “You’re right, I don’t 
like sports. But my cousin plays for the Red Sox, and that is why I am happy.” At this point, Alice 
would concede that it is reasonable for Bob to be happy about the win. Importantly, when Bob says 
that his cousin plays for the Red Sox, he offers a specifically epistemic reason for his happiness that 
the Red Sox won: he provides evidence supporting the claim that the win is good for him.  
 If we denied that emotions were epistemically assessable, the practices of (epistemic-
)rational critique and (epistemic-)reason giving surrounding emotion would be misguided. But they 
do not seem misguided at all. In this respect, emotions seem more like beliefs than bodily 
sensations. It is hard to imagine a community of creatures who criticize each other—
epistemically—for feeling nauseous or hungry or crampy, and who then defend themselves by 
giving reasons—epistemic reasons—to be so. That community’s practice seems misguided in a way 
ours does not.  
 
2. The Double Intentionality of Emotion 
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According to a popular model in the philosophy of emotions, emotions have in some sense a double 
intentionality: each emotion is intentionally directed toward two different kinds of object. One is the 
“particular object”: the thing that, colloquially, we would say the emotion is about. When one is 
afraid of a snake, the snake is the particular object of one’s fear. Particular objects can be concrete 
individual objects, such as snakes, but they may also be propositional objects, as in the fear that the 
snake will hurt me. In addition, emotions are also thought to have a second kind of object, which 
has come to be known as their “formal object” (Kenny 1963). These are thought to be properties at 
which entire emotion types are in some sense aimed. Fear is aimed at dangerousness, grief at loss, 
and so on.  
One way to think about the relationship between particular and formal objects is in terms of 
a certain division of individuative labor. If we ask of a token fear experience F, (a) what makes F 
the fear it is and (b) what makes it a fear at all, the answer is (i) that F’s particular object is what 
makes it the fear it is and (ii) its formal object is what makes it a fear at all. Joe’s fear of the snake is 
the fear it is because the snake is its particular object, and it is a fear at all because dangerousness is 
its formal object. In other words, particular objects are responsible for the individuation of token 
emotions, while formal objects are responsible for the individuation of emotion types. It is in this 
sense that Joe’s token fear is aimed at a snake whereas fear as such is aimed at dangerousness. The 
double aim, or double intentionality, of emotions reflects their double metaphysical status as token 
experiences and as tokening experience types. 
There is also a division of labor here with respect to correctness conditions. Emotions are 
sometimes correct and sometimes incorrect. Joe’s fear of the snake is correct (in the sense that Joe’s 
fear gets things right) just if the snake is dangerous. Here the particular object, the snake, tells us 
what we need to evaluate, while the formal object, dangerousness, tells us what kind of evaluation 
we must perform, to establish whether Joe’s fear is correct. Evaluating fears for correctness is just 
evaluating feared objects for dangerousness. In general, an emotion’s formal object determines the 
kind of evaluation relevant to whether the emotion is correct, while its particular object provides the 
item on which the evaluation is to be made.  
What exactly is the relationship between formal objects and particular objects? Are they 
both intentional objects? If they are, what distinguishes the formal from the particular? If they are 
not, what role does each play within the overall intentional structure of a mental state? 
 One epistemic possibility is that formal objects are indeed intentional objects, in the same 
sense particular objects are, but that they are intentional objects common and peculiar to certain 
mental state types. On this view, when we say ‘the formal object of fear is the dangerous,’ we mean 
roughly the following: 
(FO1) The property of being dangerous is represented by all and only fears. 
However, it seems false that only fears represent dangerousness. A person may believe that, 
say, scuba diving is dangerous—regardless of whether she is afraid of it. And she may also wonder 
whether scuba diving is dangerous, hope that it is dangerous (for whatever reason), and so on.  
 A second possibility is that formal objects are the explanatory grounds of the subject’s 
experiencing an emotion. On this view, when S is afraid of a dog, the representational content of 
S’s fear is the dog, not the dog’s being dangerous; nonetheless, it is because the dog is dangerous 
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(or taken by S to be dangerous) that S is in a state of fear. Thus the dog’s being dangerous (or its 
being taken by S to be dangerous) is the reason why S is in a state of fear. Here ‘the formal object 
of fear is the dangerous’ means something like: 
(FO2) The property of being dangerous is the explanatory ground for all and only fears. 
The main disadvantage of FO2 is that it casts formal objects as external to mental states’ intentional 
structure. If danger is just the explanatory ground of fear’s representation of the dog, it is not part of 
fear’s representational character itself, but something that lies outside it. There is, on this view, no 
double intentionality strictly speaking. There is just intentional directedness at a dog, and a reason 
why the dog becomes the intentional object of a fear. The problem with this is that dangerousness 
does seem to characterize the intentionality of fear. Fear frames the world a certain way, namely, as 
involving dangers. The world of the fearful is unlike the world of the fearless.  
 A third suggestion is that formal objects are not what explains, but what justifies, or 
rationalizes, the relevant mental states. It is fitting, rational, appropriate to fear that which is 
dangerous. Accordingly, the correctness conditions of fear advert to the dangerous. Here ‘the 
formal object of fear is the dangerous’ means: 
(FO3) The property of being dangerous provides the correctness conditions for all and only 
fears. 
The main problem for FO3 is with explanatory depth. FO3 offers a normative gloss on formal 
objects. But normative characteristics supervene upon non-normative characteristics, which (we 
tend to think) underlie them and are explanatorily prior to them. Thus, we should expect fear to 
have some non-normative, psychological characteristics that underlie the fact that it is fitting to fear 
only the dangerous. It would be odd to treat as brute and inexplicable the fact that fears are fitting 
only when directed at the dangerous. More plausibly, there is something about what fear is like that 
makes it fitting to experience fear toward the dangerous.  
 Our own suggestion is that talk of formal objects is in fact a roundabout way of talking 
about the mode or attitude of mental states. Each emotion type employs a distinctive mode of 
intentionally relating to its intentional object, a distinctive attitude it takes toward its content (what 
it represents). As we understand these attitudinal features, they are dimensions of mental states’ 
intentional structure, and are in fact ways of framing their intentional objects. They are just not part 
of that-which-is-being-represented. Thus, fear of a dog does not represent the dog as dangerous, 
insofar as danger is not part of what the fear represents; but it does represent-as-dangerous the dog, 
insofar as danger characterizes the manner in which the dog is framed in the fear. On this view, ‘the 
formal object of fear is the dangerous’ means: 
(FO4) All and only fears involve an attitudinal feature of representing-as-dangerous.  
By the same token, grief represents-as-a-loss its object, indignation represents-as-unjust its object, 
and so on. We contend that FO4 has many of the advantages, and none of the disadvantages, of 
FO1-FO3. First, FO4 has FO1’s advantage of casting formal objects as a dimension of 
intentionality, but like FO2, it does not construe formal objects as part of what a mental state 
represents, and like FO3, it seems to get the extension right: it is hard to imagine a case where 
someone has a state that represents-as-dangerous something the person does not fear, or where the 
person fears something none of their mental states represents-as-dangerous. At the same time, 
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unlike FO1, FO4 designates as the formal object of fear something that no other mental state 
features; unlike FO2, FO4 makes formal objects part of mental states’ intentionality, rather than 
something external to intentionality that merely explains of the state’s intentionality; and unlike 
FO3, FO4 identifies formal objects with psychological features rather than with brute normative 
properties.  
 For all these reasons, we prefer (FO4). From this perspective, talk of double intentionality 
comes down to highlighting the Janus-faced character of intentionality as involving both intentional 
objects or contents (what is represented by those states) and intentional mode or attitude (how what 
is represented is framed in those states). As noted, however, this particular take is not strictly 
mandatory for the arguments to follow. We include this discussion mostly to give more texture to 
some of the key concepts we will be using.  
 
3. Formal Objects and the Scope of the Epistemic 
The discussion of formal objects in the emotion literature is reminiscent of the notion that mental 
state types have an aim. It is commonly held, for instance, that the aim of belief is truth.1 This is 
naturally understood as the claim that the formal object of belief is truth. Thus, Petra’s belief that 
the weather is nice is the belief it is because of the particular object it is aimed at, the proposition 
that the weather is nice, but is a belief at all because of the formal object it is aimed at, truth. And 
her belief is correct (she is right to believe this) just if the proposition that the weather is nice is 
true. Truth is what we need to evaluate the proposition for when we evaluate Petra’s belief for 
correctness.  
 There are two different ways, however, of understanding correctness talk (see Glüer and 
Wikforss 2009), and correspondingly two different ways of understanding aim talk. On a purely 
descriptive understanding, correctness and incorrectness amount to something like accuracy and 
inaccuracy. On a more normative understanding, to say that a belief is correct is not merely to 
describe it, but also to commend it. The idea is that true beliefs are successful whereas false ones 
are defective. A true belief is a good instance of belief, an untrue belief is a bad instance.  
By the same token, on a descriptive understanding, to say that truth is the aim of belief is to 
say something about the nature of belief: perhaps precisely that its formal object is truth. On a 
normative understanding, to say that truth is the aim of belief is to say something about the norm of 
belief: perhaps that we should manage our beliefs with an eye to promoting truth among them.  
 Now, it is natural to think that the norm of belief is grounded in the nature of belief: if belief 
were a different kind of thing, it would be governed by different norms. It is because truth is the 
formal object of belief that we ought to promote truth among our beliefs. There are, of course, many 
ways in which truth may be promoted, but the norm that we should pursue these ways will always 
be grounded in the fact that truth is the formal object of belief. Take, for instance, the basic maxim 
believe that p only if your evidence supports p—or as Clifford (1877, 295) memorably put it, “it is 
wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” 
                                                
1 This is not the only possible view in this area, of course. Alternatives include that belief is aimed at knowledge 
(Williamson 2000) or justification (Feldman 2005). But here we will assume that truth is the aim of belief. 
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Arguably, it is because truth is the aim of belief in the descriptive sense (i.e., is the formal object of 
belief) that beliefs are subject to this maxim. More generally: 
Aim-Norm Connection: It is in virtue of the fact that truth is the formal object of belief that 
beliefs are subject to truth-promoting epistemic norms.  
Aim-Norm Connection is widely accepted in the aim-of-belief literature (see, e.g., Velleman 2000, 
246 and Boghossian 2003, 39).  
 Aim-Norm Connection is often motivated by appeal to the notion of regulation. According 
to Velleman (2000), for instance, the fact that beliefs are regulated for truth grounds both the fact 
that truth is the standard for normative correctness of belief and the fact that beliefs are subject to 
evidential norms. This regulation can be understood in at least two ways: (a) in a personal-level, 
agential sense, whereby the epistemic agent attempts to believe a proposition “with the aim of 
thereby accepting a truth” (ibid., 251); or (b) in a sub-personal, “procedural” sense, whereby the 
aim of accepting a truth is implicit in the cognitive system’s workings and encoded in its general 
tendency to form beliefs that are somehow indicated to be true. 
 Now, if Aim-Norm Connection is true, it may seem but a short step to the claim that beliefs 
have a unique epistemic status in virtue of having the formal object of truth. If what grounds the 
fact that belief is subject to epistemic norms is the fact that truth is the formal object of belief, then 
it is natural to expect mental states the formal objects of which are not truth to be subject to 
different norms, or at any rate to not be subject to epistemic norms (and thus not be epistemically 
assessable). Thus we obtain the following principle:  
Epistemic Exclusivity: Only mental states whose formal object is truth are epistemically 
assessable.  
Because beliefs have truth as their formal object, they aim at truth and are regulated for truth. Their 
aiming at, and being regulated for, truth makes it the case that they are subject to epistemic norms 
requiring that we believe in truth-conducive ways – that they are, in short, epistemically assessable. 
Mental states that have a different formal object, now, will not be regulated for truth but for 
something else. They will not aim at the truth but at whatever their formal object is.  
 Another motivation for Epistemic Exclusivity has to do with the foundational role of truth in 
epistemology. According to “veritists,” true belief is the only thing of fundamental epistemic value. 
It is not uncommon to think that epistemic norms are grounded in or explained by this value of true 
belief. For example, one might think that it is epistemically required that we believe in accordance 
with the evidence because doing so either promotes or respects the epistemic value of true belief. If 
veritism is true, and if epistemic norms stand in this special relationship to fundamental epistemic 
value, then one might be led to think that beliefs are the only mental states that are subject to these 
truth-grounded epistemic norms. Other mental states, with other formal objects, will fall outside the 
scope of epistemic normativity.  
 Epistemic Exclusivity spells trouble, however, for the principle of Epistemic Assessability 
(i.e., emotions are epistemically assessable). For as we have seen in section II, the formal objects of 
emotions are not truth. They are dangerousness (for fear), injustice (for indignation), loss (for grief), 
and so on – but not truth. But if Epistemic Exclusivity is true, then emotions do have truth as their 
formal object or emotions are not epistemically assessable.  
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 In other words, what we have on our hands here is an inconsistent triad. At least one of the 
following three antecedently plausible theses must be rejected:  
Epistemic Assessability: Emotions are epistemically assessable.  
Epistemic Exclusivity: Only mental states whose formal object is truth are epistemically 
assessable.  
Not Truth: The formal object of emotions is not truth.  
The question is which one to reject. In section IV, we consider the option of rejecting Not Truth, 
and in section V, that of rejecting Epistemic Assessability; we argue against both. Then, in section 
VI, we present our own approach to the problem, which consists rather in rejecting Epistemic 
Exclusivity.  
 
4. Rejecting Not Truth: Cognitivist Approaches  
The most natural way to reject Not Truth is to adopt a broadly cognitivist or judgmentalist account 
of emotion. According to “judgmentalists” (Solomon 1976, Nussbaum 2001), emotions are in fact 
beliefs, or judgments – doxastic states that are truth-apt. Fear of a snake, for example, just is the 
belief, or judgment, that the snake is dangerous, while grief over the death of a grandparent just is 
the belief that the grandparent’s death is a loss (or a significant personal loss, or whatever). 
 On this approach, emotions are not a sui generis kind of mental state but a particularly 
important subset of beliefs (important enough, say, for folk psychology to produce specialized 
labels for them). What distinguishes fears from griefs, on this view, is just the predicative 
component of the relevant belief contents: fear-beliefs predicate dangerousness of something, while 
grief-beliefs predicate loss-ness of something. Crucially, then, the difference between fear and grief 
pertains not to their formal but to their particular, propositional object. The formal object of all 
emotions is the same: truth. If so, Not Truth can be rejected. 
 The problem, however, is that the judgmentalist account of emotion strains credulity. At a 
very intuitive phenomenological level, emotional experience seems to be “affectively hot” in a way 
belief is not.2 But more deeply, coming down on an issue and making a judgment feels like 
committing to the truth of some proposition. Consider this example from Eli Chudnoff (2015: 98): 
is it true that if a < 1, then 2 – 2a > 0? If you are like us, you take a few seconds to think through 
this and then the feeling of truth descends on you. In this example, the feeling of truth-acceptance 
comes into phenomenological relief because of the element of mental effort required and the slight 
time-delay in experiencing it. Arguably, however, the feeling is there, albeit in a more subdued 
fashion, in all cases of consciously judging that something is the case. This feeling, however, 
clearly does not exhaust the phenomenology of typical emotional experiences. In grief over a loved 
one’s death, there may be a feeling of truth-acceptance toward the proposition ‘Grandma died.’ But 
                                                
2 Nussbaum (2004) argues that the “hotness” of emotions is due to the fact that the relevant judgments concern, or are 
about, matter of special personal importance to the person doing the judging. We find this somewhat underwhelming: 




this does not yet capture the loss-y feeling of the grief, and that loss-y feeling is not simply a feeling 
of truth-acceptance where the proposition accepted as true is ‘Grandma’s death is a terrible loss.’ 
There is more to the loss-feeling characteristic of grief than a feeling of truth-acceptance. Similarly, 
when you suddenly notice an onrushing truck coming from your blind side, and consequently 
experience an upheaval of fear, what you experience feels very different from the upheaval of truth-
recognition or truth-acceptance that comes through in Chudnoff’s case.3  
 Some approaches to emotion are not quite as radical as to identify emotions with doxastic 
states, but still claim that emotions include doxastic states as constituents. We call these doxastic-
constituent views (DCVs), and use the label “cognitivism” to cover both judgmentalist and DCVs. 
DCVs are also naturally seen as rejecting Not Truth, since they claim that an emotion is at least in 
part a mental state that has truth for its formal object.4 We will now consider three different DCVs, 
arguing against each.  
 Perhaps best known among DCVs is the view that emotions are belief-desire compounds 
(Marks 1982, Gordon 1987). On this view, fear of a snake is a combination of a belief that the 
snake is dangerous and a desire to flee the scene. When these co-occur in you, you experience fear, 
not because they cause fear in you, but because that is just what experiencing fear is.  
 There are various problems with the belief/desire compound view, of which the most 
important for present purposes is this. Consider again the experiential element in fear of an 
onrushing truck that seemed incongruent with a phenomenological description in terms of accepting 
the truth of a proposition. That additional element characteristic of fear does not seem to be what is 
recovered when we add the phenomenology of desire to the phenomenology of belief or judgment. 
It is of course difficult to pin down what the distinctive phenomenology of desire exactly is, and we 
cannot hope to consider all theoretical options here. But with the fear of the onrushing truck there 
seems to be some kind of vivid feeling of being pulled into action to avoid a negative result: you 
feel vividly pulled to jump out of the way. But adding this feeling to the feeling of accepting the 
truth of the proposition that the truck is dangerous does not quite seem to make up the difference 
with the complete phenomenology of fear. There is an affective quality to fear, pegged precisely to 
the felt sense of danger or looming harm, that goes beyond that felt pull to action. Indeed, as you 
notice the onrushing truck, you may find yourself paralyzed by fear rather than moved to action; 
your fear as the truck closes in on you need not subside in consequence, however.  
 A second DCV would add to belief not desire but something like the proprioceptive or 
kinesthetic awareness, or feeling, of bodily changes, often in internal organs. In Schachter and 
Singer’s (1962) theory, for instance, an emotion is construed as a combination of two factors, one 
cognitive and the other a felt physiological arousal. Fear, on this view, consists in a feeling of a 
                                                
3 We are open to the possibility of atypical cases of emotional experience, perhaps of the sort designated sometimes as 
“metacognitive feelings,” that do incorporate a phenomenal element of truth-acceptance. But this would not solve the 
problem as applied to the more familiar emotions mentioned in the main text. 
4 More precisely, there are two ways this approach could play out as a response to the problem posed by the above 
inconsistent triad. In one version, the claim would be that emotions have two formal objects: truth and whatever the 
formal objects are of the other mental-state constituents of emotion. In this version, Not Truth is certainly denied. In a 
different version, the claim would be that emotion has a single sui generis formal object that has truth as a constituent. 
In this version, the view would deny Epistemic Exclusivity, claiming that to be epistemically assessable a mental state 
need not have truth for its formal object, as long as it has truth for a constituent of its formal object. Either way, the 
problem would be solved and Epistemic Assessability would be saved. 
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pounding heart etc. doxastically interpreted as due to an impending danger. A third DCV adds to 
belief both desire and bodily feeling (Kriegel 2014). The advantage of adding bodily feelings to the 
account, whether or not one preserves desire, is that bodily feelings seem much more apt for 
capturing the affectively hot element of the fear experience. The sensations of visceral tumult, 
racing heart, and so on are at least the kind of thing such that, once we imagine them added to the 
phenomenology of accepting-as-true, we get a sense of the properly affective upheaval 
characteristic of experiencing fear. At the same time, the view preserves a doxastic constituent in 
emotion that might explain its epistemic assessability.  
 This is clearly DCV’s most plausible version. We do worry that construing fear as involving 
the belief that something is dangerous, whatever else one adds into the mix, would require the 
fearing subject to possess the concept of dangerousness. It is empirically quite plausible, it seems to 
us, that the capacity for fear predates the possession of this concept in infants. As Morreall (1993: 
361) points out, “Infants fear loud noises long before they have . . . concepts like danger.” And 
similarly for other emotions: a toddler’s capacity for indignation predates her possession of the 
concept of injustice, her capacity for grief predates her possession of the concept of loss, and so on.  
However, our main critique of the view under consideration targets specifically the 
epistemology of emotion. We want to argue that the view faces two important difficulties, 
difficulties that go to the very idea of reducing the epistemic assessability of emotions to that of 
beliefs.  
 First difficulty. Although there may be something epistemically problematic about holding 
inconsistent emotions, it is not quite the epistemic disgrace that holding inconsistent beliefs 
represents. Suppose you apply for a grant and the only other applicant—this you know—is your 
best friend and much admired colleague. She gets the grant. You are happy that she got the grant 
and you are sad that you did not – even though her getting the grant and your not getting it are one 
and the same state of affairs, and, crucially, you know that they are (Montague 2009). If being 
happy about something is just believing that it is good for you, and being sad about something is 
just believing that it is bad for you, then here you hold inconsistent beliefs: that the relevant state of 
affairs is both good for you and bad for you. It is true, of course, that the state of affairs is 
represented in these two beliefs under different modes of presentation. But you are aware that the 
two modes of presentation are co-referential. This is like believing that Phosphorus is round and 
that Hesperus is square despite knowing that Phosphorus is Hesperus. It is an inconsistency pure 
and simple. Now, although being both happy and sad about one and the same state of affairs is not 
epistemically irreproachable, it is more of an epistemic misdemeanor than an epistemic felony; 
whereas holding inconsistent beliefs is a cardinal epistemic sin. If emotions were epistemically 
assessable purely in virtue of having belief constituents, such a gap in epistemic status would be 
incomprehensible.  
 Might the cognitivist bank on beliefs sufficiently intricate that holding them together would 
be more like the epistemic misdemeanor we have in mind? One option here is to rely on contrastive 
beliefs as the doxastic constituents of emotion. For instance, being happy that your best friend got 
the grant might be taken to involve as constituent the belief “it is good for me that my best friend 
rather than some stranger got the grant,” while being sad that you did not get the grant involves as 
constituent the belief “it is bad for me that my best friend rather than I got the grant.” There might 
be some tension in holding seriously both beliefs, but clearly they are not strictly inconsistent.  
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 In response, we note that there is something psychologically unrealistic in requiring 
emotions to involve such intricate beliefs as constituents. On the view under consideration, a person 
who simply believes that x is bad for them is not emoting yet, but once they think that x rather than 
y is bad for them, they are emoting. Sadness separates itself from mere belief partly in virtue of the 
contrastive structure of its content. We find this psychologically unrealistic as an account of the 
nature of emotion. Moreover, we suspect again that infants and animals may be able to emote long 
before they can entertain contrastive or other specially intricate propositions.  
 Second difficulty. On the face of it, the strength of an emotion is also epistemically 
assessable. If an unleashed midsized dog approaches you, mild apprehension may be epistemically 
justified, but frenzied terror would be epistemically unjustified. And when we fear something which 
is not at all dangerous, the more intense our fear the more epistemically unjustified it is (being 
petrified of a peanut is epistemically worse than being mildly apprehensive about it). Thus our 
emotional experiences are epistemically assessable not only for their qualitative but also for their 
quantitative properties. Now, if the epistemic assessability of emotions reduced to that of belief, this 
would have to be explained by changes in strength of the emotion’s belief constituent. But as we 
will now argue, it is hard to make this sound remotely plausible.  
One cognitivist idea might be that the affective intensity of an emotion is a matter of the 
degree of value predicated in the relevant belief. For one’s fear of x to be more intense than one’s 
fear of y is for one to believe that x is dangerous to degree D+ and believe that y is dangerous to 
degree D–, such that D+ > D–. This is problematic, however, insofar as the affective intensity of 
emotions seems to lie on a continuum, whereas belief contents are perforce discrete. That is, it is 
psychologically implausible, perhaps impossible, that we should possess a concept for each degree 
of dangerousness. To capture degree differences, our danger-beliefs must use modifier concepts 
such as “very” and “very very.” But these will just have nowhere near the granularity needed to 
capture psychologically real differences in emotional intensity.  
Another cognitivist idea might be that the relevant belief contents are the same, but are held 
with different degrees of confidence—and it is in virtue of this that they are differently evaluated. 
Thus, being very confident that the dog is dangerous is epistemically unjustified while suspecting 
that it might be dangerous is justified. This approach at least captures the continuous nature of 
emotional intensity. However, when we focus on the difference between mild apprehension and 
frenzied terror that explains their differential epistemic evaluation, what we focus the mind on is a 
difference in the affectively hot dimension of the emotion, not the cold doxastic dimension. It is the 
variation in affective intensity that we epistemically assess in the first instance: what is 
epistemically unjustified is being this agitated about the dog. It may well be, of course, that we can 
also epistemically assess doxastic strength (i.e., degree of confidence). But in addition, there is the 
epistemic assessment of the subject’s level of affective agitation.  
 We take the moral of these two phenomena—that doxastic inconsistency is epistemically 
worse than emotional inconsistency and that affective intensity is epistemically assessable as well—
to be that, regardless of whether emotions have doxastic constituents, emotions are epistemically 
assessable purely in virtue of their properly affective dimension. If this is right, then attacking Not 




5. Rejecting Epistemic Assessability: A Perceptualist Approach 
What, then, about the option of rejecting Epistemic Assessability, the idea that emotions are 
epistemically assessable as justified or unjustified? Here the most natural approach is to adopt a 
broadly perceptualist view of emotion—given that most philosophers take perceptual experiences 
to be epistemically non-assessable.  
It is not straightforward exactly what perceptualism about emotion is. On one extreme is the 
view that emotions are sense perceptions. More often, the claim is rather that emotions are 
analogous to perception in some important way. What that way is also varies from one version of 
perceptualism to another. Given the present paper’s concern, the kinds of perceptualism that interest 
us are those which imply that emotions are analogous to perception epistemologically. Accordingly, 
we will use the label “perceptualism” for any view of emotion according to which emotions are like 
perceptions in all epistemic respects.  
Defenders of perceptualism emphasize similarities between perceptual illusions and 
recalcitrant emotions. With both perceptual illusions and recalcitrant emotions, one’s experience of 
the relevant object fails to match up with a judgment that one makes about the object. In the Müller-
Lyer illusion, for instance, perceptual experience presents the lines as being different lengths 
despite one’s judgment that they are the same length. Similarly, fear of flying can present flying as 
dangerous despite one’s judgment that flying is safe. Perceptualists claim that just as visual 
illusions are not assessable as epistemically unjustified, neither are recalcitrant emotions. This point 
is then leveraged in support of the more general claim that no emotions are epistemically 
assessable, either as justified or as unjustified. If so, Epistemic Assessability is false. 
To use perceptualism this way—i.e., to get out of the inconsistent triad by rejecting 
Epistemic Assessability—we need to assume that perception in general is not epistemically 
assessable. Since perceptualism claims that emotions are like perceptions in all epistemic respects, 
it would then follow that emotions are generally not epistemically assessable either. Now, as noted 
already in section I, it is possible, though quite unusual given such phenomena as the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, to hold that perceptual experience is epistemically assessable. If a perceptualist about 
emotion holds this view of perception, then the resulting version of perceptualism would not be the 
kind that could solve the inconsistent triad by rejecting Epistemic Assessability. Since our focus 
here is on solving the inconsistent triad from section III, we consider the more standard version of 
perceptualism about emotion, the one that assumes that perception in general is not epistemically 
assessable. If perceptualism of the sort we are interested in is true, then emotions are not 
epistemically assessable. In this way, perceptualists can maintain that the formal object of emotions 
is something other than truth (Not Truth) and that only mental states with the formal object of truth 
are epistemically assessable (Epistemic Exclusivity). Problem solved.  
 However, there are several problems with this solution to the problem. First, the 
perceptualist intuition in response to cases of recalcitrant emotion is not universally shared. To 
many, including us, it seems false that there is nothing epistemically objectionable about an 
emotional response that persists to eternity despite the fact that it conflicts with the subject’s 
evidence. One standard line on these cases is that while simultaneously fearing flying and believing 
that flying is safe is less irrational than believing that flying is dangerous and believing that flying is 
safe, it is irrational nonetheless. In contrast, there is nothing irrational about simultaneously 
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believing that the Müller-Lyer lines are of equal length and having a perceptual experience as of 
their being the same length. There is thus an important epistemic disanalogy between perception 
and emotion (see Helm 2001 and following him many others).  
 Second, even if perceptualism did get things right about recalcitrant emotions, the emphasis 
on recalcitrant emotions obscures the commonsense observation that in many normal, in no way 
atypical cases, when we acquire evidence that undermines a particular emotional response, the 
emotional response tends to fade. That is, emotions are typically not recalcitrant. Suppose a man 
bumps into you on the subway. You feel inside your coat pocket and realize that your wallet is 
gone. Thinking that the man has stolen your wallet, you become angry. You then see that the wallet 
has actually fallen on the floor, and the anger dissipates rather quickly (even if not immediately). 
This is not some weird fringe case but a very typical sort of case: first, you acquire some evidence 
(the man bumped into you and the wallet is missing); second, an emotion is formed on the basis of 
that evidence (you become angry); third, you acquire some counter-evidence (the wallet is on the 
floor); finally, the emotion dissipates in light of the counter-evidence (you are no longer angry). 
Anger is thus often evidence-responsive in a way perception is not. 
One might doubt whether in this case the emotion itself is responding to the evidence. 
Perhaps it is in the first instance your belief about the wallet being stolen that is responding to the 
evidence (e.g., the visual experience of the wallet on the floor), and the change in the emotion is 
merely a causal consequence of the revised belief. Maybe so. But this would still be a way for the 
emotion to respond to evidence. We might call it “doxastically mediated evidence-responsiveness.” 
Importantly, perceptions generally seem to lack even doxastically mediated evidence-
responsiveness. Even when one confidently believes that the stick is straight, one still sees it as 
bent. Thus, the contrast between the evidence-responsiveness of emotions and perceptions remains.  
 A third problem with the proposed perceptualist resolution of our inconsistent triad is that 
the evidence-unresponsiveness of recalcitrant emotions may be a local failure rather than 
constitutive of emotion as such. Recall that the temptation to think that recalcitrant emotions are not 
epistemically assessable comes from their being unresponsive to evidence. This, after all, is what 
recalcitrant emotions have in common with visual illusions. But notice that local unresponsiveness 
to evidence does not establish that a state is epistemically non-assessable. Beliefs that do not 
respond appropriately to evidence, for example, may be epistemically unjustified (i.e., assessable 
negatively) rather than epistemically non-assessable. Astrological beliefs often fail to respond to 
evidence, but we do not exempt them from epistemic evaluation on that basis. On the contrary, we 
evaluate them specially harshly. In other words, there is a difference between local failure to 
respond to evidence and constitutive evidence-unresponsiveness. And as we have just seen with the 
wallet case, emotions do not seem to be constitutively evidence-unresponsive at all. 
Recall, moreover, that Epistemic Assessability is not a universally quantified thesis. Thus 
for our purposes it is not essential that all emotions be epistemically assessable.5 As we have 
argued, in many very normal cases, when we acquire evidence that undermines a particular 
                                                
5 We do recognize that there would be something theoretically unappealing about a picture of emotion in which some of 
them are epistemically assessable and some are not. So we face a choice between pushing for the universal thesis and 
explaining (away) a fairly fundamental disunity in emotion. This is an important choice, but we do not need to take a 
stand on it here. We suspect that ultimately all emotions are epistemically assessable, and the stubbornly recalcitrant 
ones are simply epistemically unjustified. But this position is not germane to our main concerns in this paper.  
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emotional response, that response tends to fade. Emotions may be slower than beliefs to respond to 
evidence, in that a certain emotional inertia often lingers with us beyond the moment of evidence 
acquisition. Nonetheless, emotions that are eternally and absolutely insensitive to evidence in the 
way nausea, hunger, and the perception of a bent stick are do not seem to be the rule; and all we 
want to insist on is that evidence-sensitive emotional responses are not fringe exceptions either. 
 This difference in evidence-sensitivity between perceptions and emotions points to a 
corresponding difference in their epistemic properties. The fact that perceptual experiences (like 
bodily sensations) are insensitive to changes in evidence is naturally taken to explain why they are 
not candidates for epistemic justification. Just as we take the actions of creatures irresponsive to 
moral reasons to be not morally evaluable, so too we should think that kinds of mental states that 
are irresponsive to epistemic reasons are not epistemically evaluable. Perceptions are not, in the 
typical case, responsive to reasons. But emotions are. And so, there is a principled difference 
between perceptions and emotions that warrants epistemically assessing the latter but not the 
former. 
 We conclude that the perceptualist interpretation of what is going on epistemologically with 
recalcitrant emotions is unconvincing.  
 
6. Formal Objects and Epistemic Assessability 
In this section, we offer our own solution to the problem posed by the inconsistent triad from 
section III, a solution consisting in the rejection of Epistemic Exclusivity. Our approach builds on 
three basic ideas. First, there is a distinction between the what and the how of regulation; in the case 
of belief, for instance, truth is what it is regulated for, and evidentially is at least part of how belief 
is regulated. Second, what makes belief the paradigm epistemically assessable state is not, at least 
not just, the fact that it is regulated for truth; it is also, at least in part, the fact that it is regulated 
evidentially. And third, although emotions are not regulated for truth, but for their own proprietary 
aims or formal objects, they are nonetheless evidentially regulated. This, we argue, is what makes 
emotions epistemically assessable: one can meaningfully ask of each token emotional experience 
whether it was formed in an evidentially proper way. And so Epistemic Exclusivity is to be 
rejected: Not only mental states whose formal object is truth are epistemically assessable. So long 
as a mental state type is evidentially regulated for whatever it is regulated for, epistemic evaluation 
of that state will make sense.  
 Start with the distinction between the what and the how of regulation. It is easy to appreciate 
in abstracto that the regulation of any system has a certain aim it tries to serve, and also employs a 
specific manner of attempting to best serve that aim. And in principle, two systems regulated for the 
same thing may employ different styles of regulation: one system regulates for aim A in way W1 
while another regulates for A in way W2. Take living organisms. These are complex systems (self-
)regulated for something like survival and reproduction. But the natural world offers a staggering 
multiplicity of ways living organisms are (self-)regulated for survival and reproduction. In plants 
the system’s activity is regulated centrally using photosynthesis; in animals this has no role. 
Conversely, it is also possible to imagine two complex systems regulated for different aims but 
exhibiting an overlap in the way they regulate for these aims. Thus, two systems of government, a 
liberal democracy and an autocratic dictatorship say, may have two completely different aims – one 
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is regulated for the wellbeing of the citizenry, whereas in the other that has no role – but the use of a 
police force in law enforcement is central to the way both systems regulate for their respective aims. 
 Naturally, the what/how distinction applies to the regulation of beliefs as well. In particular, 
we want to suggest, belief is not just regulated for truth, it is evidentially regulated for truth. That is, 
it is through the use of evidence that we regulate for truth. (It is an open question whether evidential 
regulation is the only form of belief regulation. We need not take a stand on this here.) Now, in the 
aim-of-belief literature, the notion of regulation-for-truth and the notion of evidential regulation 
tend to be run together, presumably due to insensitivity to the fact that the former concerns the 
what, or aim, of regulation, whereas the latter concerns the how, or manner, of regulation. Consider 
the following two passages from Shah and Velleman:  
In forming and retaining a belief… one responds to evidence and reasoning in ways that are 
designed to be truth-conducive. Hence belief is regulated for truth, whereas other, non-
belief-involving cognitive attitudes are not. (2005, p. 498) 
Being regulated for truth consists partly in responsiveness to evidence. The belief that p 
tends to be formed in response to evidence of p’s truth, to be reinforced by additional 
evidence of it, and to be extinguished by evidence against it (ibid., p. 500) 
We agree with Shah and Velleman both that beliefs are regulated for truth and that they are 
evidentially regulated. But from this neither of the following follows: 
(T1) If a mental state M is regulated for truth, then necessarily, M is evidentially regulated. 
(T2) If a mental state M is evidentially regulated, then necessarily, M is regulated for truth. 
We suspect that (T1) is nonetheless true. What we want to deny is (T2). We want to argue that 
emotions are evidentially regulated, despite not being regulated for truth. Thus there can be 
evidential regulation for aims other than truth.  
 Once we cleanly distinguish between regulation for truth and evidential regulation as two 
characteristics of the regulation of belief systems, the question arises of which of these two grounds 
the epistemic assessability of belief, that is, of whether belief is epistemically assessable (a) because 
truth is what belief is regulated for or (b) because evidentially is how belief is regulated. More 
specifically, there seem to be four possibilities here: 
(1)  Truth Ground: Belief is epistemically assessable in virtue of being regulated for truth. 
(2)  Evidence Ground: Belief is epistemically assessable in virtue of being evidentially 
regulated. 
(3)  Conjunctive Ground: Belief is epistemically assessable in virtue of being both regulated for 
truth and regulated evidentially. 
(4)  Disjunctive Ground: Belief is epistemically assessable in virtue of being either regulated for 
truth or regulated evidentially.  
Why is belief epistemically assessable whereas mental states like supposition or imagination are 
not? According to (1), regulation for truth is what makes it the case that the former is epistemically 
assessable and the latter are not. According to (2), it is rather because imaginations and suppositions 
are not evidentially regulated that they are not epistemically assessable. One’s daydream about 
vacationing on the beach is not sensitive to the evidence that one is actually quarantined in one’s 
 
15 
tiny New York City apartment, because daydreams are not evidentially regulated. These are not the 
sorts of considerations that daydreams are sensitive to. And it is in virtue of this that they are not 
epistemically assessable. According to (3), it is precisely because belief is evidentially regulated for 
truth—regulated for just that and regulated just that way—that it is epistemically assessable. 
Imaginations and suppositions are doubly disqualified, on this view. Finally, according to (4), 
regulation for truth and evidential regulation are each sufficient for epistemic assessability. On this 
view, belief is doubly qualified as epistemically assessable (perhaps this is why belief is a paradigm 
of epistemic assessability). 
 We think of the choice among (1)-(4) as important future work in epistemology. We cannot 
settle such a foundational issue here, but would like to propose that either (2) or (4) must be right: 
epistemic assessability is grounded either in evidential regulation or in regulation-for-truth-or-
evidential-regulation. What (2) and (4) have in common is that evidential regulation is sufficient for 
epistemic assessability. And the consideration we want to put forward in favor of this is simply that 
this is by far the most plausible way to diffuse the puzzle captured in our inconsistent triad.  
 For, as we have argued in sections I and V, emotions do seem to be evidentially regulated. 
Anger tends to be formed in response to evidence of the presence of offense, to be reinforced by 
additional evidence of the presence of offense, and to be extinguished by evidence against the 
presence of offense. What anger is regulated for is detecting offense, not truth. But the way in 
which it is regulated for detecting offense is evidential. And in virtue of this feature anger, like 
belief, is epistemically assessable. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for fear, joy, and other 
emotion types. Similarly, fear is typically formed in response to evidence of danger and typically 
dissipates in response to the evidence being undermined or outweighed. What fear is regulated for 
is the presence of danger, because danger is the formal object of fear. Accordingly, what fear and 
anger are regulated for is tied up with what makes them the emotions they are—their formal object. 
Still, what makes them the emotions they are need not be what makes them epistemically 
assessable. What makes them epistemically assessable, we propose, is that they are evidentially 
regulated for whatever they are regulated for. The fact that this is (at least part of) the way they are 
regulated means that it makes sense to ask whether this token anger indeed fits the evidence, 
whether that token fear is well supported by the evidence, and so on. It means it makes sense to 
epistemically evaluate token emotional experiences.   
So, this is our solution to the problem posed by the inconsistent triad from section III. We 
reject Epistemic Exclusivity, because we deny that it is (only) in virtue of having truth as its formal 
object that belief is subject to epistemic norms. Take the norm believe that p only if your evidence 
supports p (i.e., supports p’s being true). On our view, belief is subject to this norm not (only) 
because truth is what it is regulated for, but (also) because evidentially is how it is regulated for it. 
Therefore, it is not (just) in virtue of the fact that truth is the formal object of belief that beliefs are 
epistemically assessable; rather, it is (also) because beliefs are evidentially regulated. Emotions, too, 
are evidentially regulated. This is why the following norm applies to fear: fear x only if your 
evidence supports x’s being dangerous. Indignation is subject to the following norm: feel indignant 
about y only if your evidence supports y’s being unjust. And so emotions too are epistemically 
assessable, despite having different formal objects. Epistemic Exclusivity is false.  
It should be pointed out that this approach to the inconsistent triad does leave some loose 
ends that would need to be addressed. There is in the position defended here something 
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unattractively opaque about the link between emotions’ formal objects and their manner of 
regulation. When a mental state is aimed at truth, we can see why evidence would play a central 
role in how it is regulated. The link between the “what for” and the “how” of regulation is then 
transparent. But when a mental state is aimed at loss, or danger, or injustice, it is less transparent 
why it should be regulated evidentially. There is nothing about the nature of the “what for” that 
makes us see why evidence would play a role in the “how.” A complete theory of epistemic 
assessability would have to address such issues.  
What are the implications of this approach for the debate over the nature of emotion? We 
have argued against the cognitivist and perceptualist solutions to the problem posed in section III. 
Notice, however, that for the most part we did not argue against cognitivism and perceptualism as 
such, but rather against (a) the idea that cognitivism offers a satisfactory explanation of the 
epistemic assessability of emotion and (b) the idea that perceptualism offers a plausible way of 
denying the epistemic assessability of emotions. On our view, emotions are epistemically 
assessable, but not (only) in virtue of being, or involving as constituents, cognitive or doxastic 
states. This view tolerates certain versions of both cognitivism and perceptualism: versions of 
cognitivism which include, in addition to a doxastic constituent, an “affectively hot” constituent, 
and insist that this affective constituent is evidentially regulated, that is, that emotions are evidence-
sensitive also in virtue of having this constituent; as well as versions of perceptualism that embrace 
a non-standard perceptual epistemology wherein perceptions are evidence-responsive.  
There are, of course, many other theories of emotion, and for some of them our view may 
have more decisive implications. For instance, according to the so-called James-Lange theory of 
emotion, emotions are essentially bodily sensations (more precisely: proprioceptive perceptions of 
internal bodily events). Insofar as bodily sensations are paradigms of epistemic non-assessability, 
we find the James-Lange theory woefully inapt. Conversely, our view is quite congenial to 
primitivist or non-reductive approaches to emotion. Cognitivism, perceptualism, and the James-
Lange theory are often put forward with a reductive ambition, namely, to reductively explain 
emotions in terms of mental states of other categories. But some philosophers have resisted any 
such reduction, claiming that emotions constitute a sui generis category of mental state, perhaps 
with an irreducibly affective phenomenology (Dewlaque 2017). The notion—defended here—that 
emotions are epistemically assessable but not in virtue of being (or involving) cognitive states, but 
rather in virtue of an evidence-responsive affectively hot component, is obviously congenial to such 
non-reductivism. To be sure, it does not quite entail emotion primitivism, nor does emotion 
primitivism entail it. Still, our account assigns to emotions a sui generis epistemic status, and this 
certainly supports the idea that emotions are a sui generis kind of mental state. 
 
Conclusion 
According to us, all mental states have a double intentionality: a particular object (often a 
proposition) they are directed at, and a formal object (always some value) they aim at. The formal 
object of a mental state type is what individuates it: what makes a mental state token belong to the 
type it does is that token’s formal object. The formal object also imposes certain norms on the 
mental states, and dictates what the state is regulated for. In the case of belief, the formal object is 
truth, and this imposes truth-promoting norms on beliefs and dictates that what belief is regulated 
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for is truth. This may understandably suggest that belief is subject to epistemic evaluation because 
truth is its formal object, and as a corollary, that any mental state which does not have truth for a 
formal object is not subject to epistemic evaluation. However, in this paper we argued that 
examination of the epistemology and double intentionality of emotions shows this to be wrong. 
Emotions do not have truth for a formal object and yet they are subject to epistemic evaluation. We 
have proposed that what makes emotions epistemically evaluable is not what they are regulated for 
but how they are regulated for it – in particular, the fact that they are evidentially regulated is a 
sufficient ground for their epistemic evaluability. This proposal has far-reaching consequences for 
one’s conception of the sphere of the epistemic. If we are right, mental phenomena concerned with 
truth form only a small subset of the epistemic domain. Any constitutively evidence-responsive 
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